Malicious actors are increasingly using TLS to evade deep packet inspection (DPI). In response, vendors and enterprises have turned to man-in-themiddle (MITM) proxies to enable security monitoring of encrypted traffic. This approach not only breaks the end-to-end authentication component of TLS but requires clients to trust a root certificate that allows the proxy to masquerade as any domain. This paper presents Locally Operated Cooperative Key Sharing (LOCKS), a novel system that enables local clients to share their TLS session keys with the enterprise security monitoring system, facilitating DPI without subverting authentication.
Introduction
Due to concerns over security and privacy, websites and end users are increasingly turning to encryption, specifically Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), for web-based communication 1 . This trend, spurred in part by internet giants such as Google, Facebook, and Netflix, is expected to increase global TLS traffic 30-40x between 2012 and * Sandia National Laboratories is a multi-program laboratory managed and operated by Sandia Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation, for the U.S. Department of Energys National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-AC04-94AL85000. The Department of Homeland Security sponsored the production of this material under DOE Contract Number DE-AC-04 94AL85000 for the management and operation of Sandia National Laboratories.
1. This report uses the term TLS when referring to both TLS and SSL.
2018 [6] . Encryption is critical for the online safety and privacy of end users, but it complicates the defense of enterprise networks.
Enterprise networks often use deep packet inspection (DPI), through tools like Snort and Bro [10] , to monitor and protect their networks. DPI examines the data portion of network packets to discover and prevent malicious activity. Data encryption blinds these tools, preventing them from effectively analyzing the traffic.
To enable DPI on encrypted traffic, many enterprises deploy man-in-the-middle (MITM) proxies. Clients connect to these proxies who impersonate the end server. The proxy then connects to the desired server pretending to be the original client. To facilitate this deception, a root certificate is deployed on, and trusted by all clients. With this certificate, a malicious actor can successfully authenticate false credentials for any website to users who believe they are protected. Enterprises today are stuck between two poor choices: remaining blind to TLS traffic or trusting a single certificate and breaking TLS authentication.
In order to preserve the end-to-end integrity of the original TLS connection while enabling enterprise security monitoring we created a new security protocol that we call LOCKS, Locally Operated Cooperative Key Sharing. LOCKS enables users within the enterprise to share their TLS session keys with a trusted agent (TA). The TA works with the enterprise network security monitoring systems to permit decryption of TLS traffic and DPI on the encapsulated traffic. LOCKS does not compromise authentication and is completely invisible to the end user.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explores background and related work. The architecture and design of LOCKS is presented in Section 3. We evaluate LOCK's performance in Section 4 and present some limitations of the architecture and lessons learned in Section 5.
Background and Related Work
In this section, we present some background on the TLS protocol. We then discuss the use of MITM for encrypted traffic DPI and present a survey of related research.
Transport Layer Security (TLS)
The primary use case for LOCKS is inspecting TLS traffic. At a high level, TLS creates a secure connection between two parties over an insecure network, providing assurances of privacy, integrity and authenticity. It is this privacy protection that inhibits network security monitors from inspecting the traffic. For our work we used TCP as a reliable transport, but nothing in our design prohibits TLS variants that use UDP.
During the establishment of the TLS connection, a set of session keys are negotiated between the client and server. These are intended only to provide privacy and integrity for a specific conversation and have no other value once the session ends. In contrast, the root certificates used by MITM often last for years and allow authentication as any domain, unlike typical X509 certificates which are limited to a specific domain.
Man-in-the-middle Interception
While MITM proxies enable deep packet inspection of privacy protected TLS traffic, they sacrifice authentication. A MITM proxy is positioned between two communicating parties, and relays the messages back and forth as shown in Instead of having a secure end-to-end connection to the server, the client negotiates a secure connection with the MITM proxy, which uses a root certificate to masquerade as the server. The MITM proxy then negotiates a secure connection with the server pretending to be the client. The proxy then proxies the data between these two connections; decrypting on one side, inspecting, and then re-encrypting on the other side.
By breaking the end-to-end connection, MITM proxies introduce many security concerns. The client receives the MITM proxy's certificate rather than the real certificate generated by the end server, forcing it to trust the proxy to authenticate the server. Also, the MITM's certificate must be accepted throughout the enterprise to authenticate as any webserver, creating a significant vulnerability if compromised. These certificates last for years and can authenticate any domain on the internet, unlike session keys which last hours and can only decrypt communications from a single session.
As a result, the MITM proxy provides an attractive target for attackers. Compromise of the MITM proxy allows for the interception and modification of any traffic passing through the proxy and the generation of certificates for arbitrary sites that clients using the proxy will accept as valid.
Related Work
Jarmoc [7] discusses attacks on MITM interception proxies. Although this work does not discuss new ways to handle encrypted traffic, it does detail many of the dangers associated with MITM proxies. MITM proxies are high value targets due to their access to sensitive data and critical certificates. Because MITM proxies disrupt authentication to inspect encrypted traffic, there are a variety of unintended consequences, including weaker encryption, transitive trust, and key pair caching attacks.
Vulnerabilities on MITM boxes, including CVE-2012-3372 have been exploited in the wild [1] . These exploitations reinforce the weaknesses of MITM proxies, their exposure to attacks, and the risk they pose to an enterprise.
Naylor et al. [9] propose an extension to TLS called Multi-Context TLS (mcTLS) to address the privacy and security issues caused by MITM proxies. In mcTLS, every party in the connection is assigned a privilege level (endpoint, read/write, read, or none). This protocol increases security by restoring the endto-end authentication and encryption of TLS and provides both the client and server with fine-grained control over their level of privacy. However, use of mcTLS requires all endpoints and middleboxes to support the modified protocol and has increased overhead due to the need to generate and distribute read and write keys to the appropriate middleboxes.
Sherry et al. [13] propose a new protocol for monitoring encrypted traffic. They introduce an extended handshake for the encrypted connection, which adds penalties of up to 97 seconds. Wilson et al. [15] propose a modification to the TLS protocol in order to monitor encrypted traffic. While these approaches enable TLS monitoring without MITM proxies, they require either new protocols entirely, or modifications to the existing protocol. LOCKS does not modify the existing TLS protocol and relies on its fundamental security.
While LOCKS is specifically not designed to share session keys outside of the enterprise, the notion of session key sharing has been previously explored. Goh et al. [5] details a covert exfiltration attack where the ephemeral keys are shared with a party outside of the enterprise.
Finally, the issues of intercepting encrypted traffic has been quite active in the press. Our system here focuses on supporting security monitoring for consenting parties. We agree that a "Keys Under Doormats" approach [2] is not the right way to improve enterprise security. We believe every user is a part of the entire enterprise security solution. LOCKS enables willing parties to participate in enterprise security.
Architecture
LOCKS is designed to perform enterprise-scale TLS DPI without compromising authentication or integrity of the underlying TLS session. As seen in Figure 2 , our system is comprised of four main components: the client endpoint, a trusted agent, an intrusion detection system (IDS) and the server endpoint. Client: A Firefox browser with modified Network Security Services (NSS) library that registers TLS session keys and associated data to the TA upon completion of the TLS handshake. Communication between the client and server is paused by modifying the callback executed after the NSS library has established an SSL session. The communication resumes once the keys are stored with the TA. Trusted Agent: A server that collects and stores keys and metadata from clients and supports the IDSs needed to decrypt traffic. To reduce latency, our TA automatically forwards recent keys to the IDS for caching. IDS: Modified Bro instance that matches TLS sessions with their encryption keys and performs decryption. Bro was selected because it is opensource and its powerful protocol analyzer (PIA) robustly identifies TLS connections and can handle TLS connections tunneled within other protocols. The decrypted payload is passed back to the PIA for analysis, thus enabling DPI. Server Endpoint: LOCKS is designed to work with existing TLS servers and requires no changes by the server endpoint. We evaluated LOCKS on both local and public TLS servers, further covered in Section 4.2. When a client initiates a TLS connection with the server, the two parties agree on a set of symmetric session keys. As soon as the client generates its session keys, they are shared with the LOCKS trusted agent (before any additional information is sent on the TLS connection). Once the keys have been registered, they are stored in the LOCKS database and pushed to the IDS. Depending on the network architecture, the IDS can either decrypt traffic inline (as an intrusion prevention system), decrypt traffic in an out-of-band monitoring mode, or simply record the encrypted traffic and use the keys for post-event forensics.
Benefits
LOCKS provides many key advantages over existing encrypted traffic monitoring solutions.
1) LOCKS allows the existing TLS protocol to operate as designed. Secure communications is a challenging problem. The many changes and updates to the TLS protocol have shown how subtle issues can easily weaken the security assurances users have. To this end, our approach focused on leaving the existing TLS protocol untouched. 2) LOCKS removes the burden of maintaining a root certificate authority on the network boundary. Traditional MITM proxies generate and sign TLS certificates, faking authentication as the clients desired end point. This breaks end-to-end authentication between the client and the server. This certificate authority must be trusted by all clients within the enterprise and it must sit on the network boundary open to the internet. LOCKS doesn't require fake authentication and as a result doesn't open up such a significant threat surface. 3) LOCKS provides users the ability to control when they share session keys and as a result they can opt out for sensitive websites, such as banking and healthcare. 4) LOCKS reduces the total workload by only requiring one additional decryption. On the other hand, MITM requires the proxy to both decrypt and re-encrypt traffic. 5) LOCKS enables a much richer set of enterprise policies, ranging from just recording keys and only decrypting during an investigation to complete real-time monitoring and many way-points in between.
Selectively-Providing Keys
In addition to ensuring the keys are securely received by the agent, we are exploring ways for the client to easily specify which keys they wish to share. It is important that the end user is aware of the consequences of sending keys that protect sensitive personal information. While the trusted agent can have a blacklist configured for sensitive domains, the user is better positioned to know which domains they consider sensitive.
Evaluation
LOCKS was evaluated from three different perspectives: impact on client latency, usability for end users, and impact on sites' existing DPI infrastructure. In all test cases, LOCKS met or exceeded the performance of MITM. User testing indicated a positive user experience with little change for users. Our Bro system saw increased overhead as it executed full packet decryption but still achieved reasonable performance.
Download Latency
Browser latency is always a concern of users and developers. To measure the impact of LOCKS on this communication latency, we ran tests to download 100 Kilobyte and 10 Megabyte files from both a local web server and one hosted on an Amazon web services (AWS) instance. These comparison tests give a sense of the effect of LOCKS in a variety of environments.
We set up our tests to run through similar network paths with MITM and LOCKS being the only difference. Figure 3 shows how this path looked for both tests. All browsers were routed through at our IDS proxy to provide a common starting point for timing and IDS monitoring. For LOCKS tests, the IDS proxy included a Bro instance running IDS and decrypting traffic. Next, all traffic moved through a corporate HTTP proxy to a Bluecoat IDS, which performed MITM interception for the MITM test case, before moving on to the target server. This setup isolated performance differences between tests to the method used for DPI by providing comparable paths with the same number of network hops. Network packet captures allowed download duration to be calculated as the time difference between a connection's initial SYN packet and the ACK packet acknowledging the receipt of the final data of the download. Each test was run a total of 100 times and the five worst values were dismissed as outliers. Tables 1 and 2 show the results of the tests running to a webserver in the same network and on the cloud respectively. On average, LOCKS performs better than MITM in many cases, but the difference in the two methods is minor when compared to the variation in network latency.
To enable a side-by-side visual comparison of these tests, we created box and whisker diagrams that show our latency results for each set of tests, Figures 4-5. Each box shows the middle third for the observed values, the line in that box represents the median, and the bars above and below show the fifth and ninetyfifth percentiles. From these results, we again show that the differences between LOCKS and MITM are negligible when compared to the typical variations in network behavior. 
LOCKS Usability Testing
To evaluate user experience, we used the System Usability Scale (SUS) created by John Brooke from Digital Equipment Corporation in 1986 [3] . The SUS evaluates the subjective ease of use as perceived by individual users through 10 multiple choice questions. Each question is answered on a 1 (Strongly Disagree) through 5 (Strongly Agree) scale. These answers are combined to give a scalar result. While the final questionnaire results range from 0 to 100, they are not a percentile ranking. Based upon years of research, a score of 68 or above is considered to be above average [4] . Figure 6 shows how SUS scores are translated to a normalized percentile.
A survey of initial alpha users produced an average 
Measuring Impact On IDS
LOCKS augments existing DPI solutions with the ability to inspect TLS encrypted sessions. To measure LOCKS' impact on our IDS, we compared the performance of the Bro IDS both with and without TLS decryption enabled.
We set up a test bed on a controlled network consisting of a client, a machine running a Squid proxy and Bro, and a web server with the same benchmark as was used in the latency measurements. Traffic shaping tools available in Linux were used to vary the bandwidth between nodes and run multiple browser instances to vary the number of simultaneous clients.
To gauge the effect of decryption on Bro, we made use of the included "capture loss" facility [11] to measure the loss rate or amount of client-server traffic that is dropped before it is seen by the sensor. As a passive monitor, Bro reconstructs the TLS sessions from the network traffic. Bro tracks events like ACK for packets it did not see, and other similar gaps in the traffic flows, and uses this to estimate the loss rate. No loss was observed during testing and, since all traffic passed through the host running Bro, loss could only be introduced if Bro could not process traffic at line speed.
The nature of handling, and decrypting, TLS sessions is embarrassingly parallel. As more flows are added, they can be handled by simply adding more resources. Bro has its own limitations on scalability and, to avoid measuring the limitations of Bro's scalability, we took advantage of the parallel nature of TLS decryption to measure the effect on a single Bro instance [14] . As the Bro instance becomes less able to handle the workload without introducing loss, we can gauge, with the limitations laid out by Weaver and Sommer, how a cluster of Bro instances would handle a scaled up workload.
The effect of LOCKS was measured by independently varying the number of clients and the bandwidth of the connection being monitored by Bro. The number of clients was varied from 10 to 50 performing downloads in parallel in steps of 10 clients. The connection bandwidth was varied from 100 Mbps to 400 Mbps in steps of 100 Mbps. Figure 7 shows a sample of the results of these measurements. For this test, 40 clients performed downloads in parallel through a connection whose bandwidth was throttled at different rates. As shown in the figure, the decryption enabled by LOCKS (blue, solid line) puts enough additional load on Bro to increase the packet loss it induces as compared to a system not running LOCKS (red, dashed line). Negating these losses will either necessitate increasing the computational resources available to Bro or accepting the small additional loss. 
Limitations and Lessons Learned

Software Support
With MITM, each client needs to be configured to trust certificates generated by the MITM's certificate authority (CA) to avoid browser warnings and restricted access. Software updates may require reconfiguration to trust the MITM CA, but most will retain the configuration through updates.
While LOCKS requires modifications to the software packages themselves to support the new semantics, most software packages use common TLS libraries that can be easily modified to support LOCKS. However, some software makes use of custom TLS stacks or use TLS libraries in non-standard ways. We are actively exploring mitigation strategies to deal with these edge cases.
In some browsers, TLS libraries provide a facility that can be used to export the TLS session keys or premaster secret to a specified file. These exported parameters could be registered with the trusted agent, providing the same information as our software modifications, without requiring any modifications to the software stack.
TLS Protocol Complexity
The TLS standards are complex, and ensuring that the semantics work for all possible use cases can be difficult. In the standard usage, there is a single client/server handshake, and after that, all subsequent messages are application data that would be decrypted, with a final message to indicate the connection is being closed. However, nothing in the protocol requires this communication pattern. For example, it's possible for clients and servers to perform a second handshake routine after the first one to renegotiate the session parameters, including the session keys.
New versions of TLS can add or deprecate ciphers and make changes to the protocol semantics in both obvious and subtle ways. TLS 1.1 changed the CBC-mode cipher text message to include an explicit initialization vector (IV), whereas in TLS 1.0 and earlier, the IV was simply the last block from the previous message. Additionally, newer GCM mode ciphers combine the encryption and MAC keys into one key, negating the need for explicit checksumming, and subtly changing the mechanics of message processing. The net effect is that with each new release of a TLS standard, or even with new releases of clients, servers or TLS libraries, there may be different ciphers or different TLS communication patterns.
By breaking the end-to-end TLS session, MITM proxies can force the clients and servers to use only ciphers and TLS parameters supported by the proxy. If updated clients and servers retain backwards compatibility with the supported TLS parameters of the proxy, the MITM can easily support new clients and servers.
The LOCKS IDS is not positioned where it can influence TLS parameter negotiation, and the client and server can choose ciphers or TLS semantics not supported by LOCKS. In this scenario, the only options available to an organization would be to prevent the TLS session from occurring or to allow encrypted traffic to pass through their network un-decrypted. This can be mitigated by having organizations limit the TLS options on client machines, and by tightly controlling the software available on the machines.
Key Identification
The MITM proxy knows which keys are applicable to a given session by virtue of having negotiated them with both the client and server. In LOCKS, this negotiation is separate from the IDS. Since the IDS must also perform decryption it needs to correctly identify which keys from the trusted agent correspond to a given TLS session.
In the simple case, the IDS can use the 5-tuple of source address, source port, destination address, destination port and protocol. However, the use of a NAT or eventual port re-use by client and server may make it difficult to match a given flow to its keys. The NAT problem may be mitigated by placing the IDS within the NAT, but this increases deployment and maintenance costs.
An alternative method of key identification is the use of session IDs and tickets. These parameters are sent in cleartext across the wire and are used to reduce connection setup latency when a client is reconnecting to a server. IDs and tickets can be shared by multiple sessions, and new keys are generated for each session using per-session random values through a complex process that can change as new versions of the TLS standards are adopted. These values could be used by LOCKS to generate session keys; however, they are not required in the TLS standards and their cleartext transmission allows an attacker to reuse an existing ID or ticket from another session to mask its true session keys.
TLS Flow Regulation
By breaking the end-to-end TLS session, MITM proxies guarantee that they can intercept all encrypted traffic. Organizations can then easily set up rules that prevent TLS traffic from traversing their network without going through their MITM proxy.
LOCKS does not provide the same guarantee. It is possible for the client and server to communicate, whether or not the IDS is able to decrypt the traffic. A firewall between the client and server can be configured to drop encrypted traffic until the appropriate keys have been received by the trusted agent. However, the specifics of TLS make this difficult to deploy in practice. To selectively drop encrypted TLS traffic, the firewall needs to be able discern whether a given packet contains encrypted records. Given that TLS runs over TCP connections, the firewall will need to be able to reconstruct the TCP session in the same fashion as the client and servers. Since multiple TLS records can be contained in a single packet, some encrypted and some not encrypted, the firewall also needs to be able to break up and reconstruct these packets so that the handshake gets forwarded on, and the encrypted traffic dropped. Future versions of TLS are looking to increase this mixture of encrypted and plaintext TLS records in the same packet with 0-RTT handshakes [12] . Beyond these protocol issues, the firewall needs to provide some method for the trusted agent or the IDS to dynamically whitelist flows. There are systems available like OpenFlow that can ease this whitelisting [8] .
Instead of having the firewall drop the encrypted traffic, another configuration would have the IDS blacklist traffic once either the TLS handshake has finished, or the IDS has realized the client will not be registering the key. However, as soon as the handshake has finished the client and server can communicate, and during the period between when the handshake has finished, and the rules to blacklist the traffic are inserted into the firewall, the client and server can communicate. Depending on this delay, this method can allow for significant client and server communication, negating the benefits of blacklisting the traffic at all. This problem is exacerbated by the increasing use of encrypted data along with the handshake.
It may be possible to place the IDS inline to the packet stream (e.g. via an IPS mode or via OpenFlow rules). This would allow the IDS to stop flows at the exact moment they need to be stopped. However, this inline packet system could introduce performance problems into the network traffic and could provide an additional attack vector for DoSing the network by attacking the IDS itself.
Conclusion
The successful use of LOCKS has shown that this approach can be an effective way to enable security monitoring on encrypted traffic. We deployed LOCKS in an enterprise environment to measure and observe the performance, security and usability impacts versus a MITM solution.
Many of the limits and difficulties we encountered were not due to issues in our architecture or difficulties with deployment. Instead, these challenges involved minor items in the TLS protocol. We believe a key conclusion we can draw from our work in developing LOCKS is the need for an extension to the TLS protocol that consciously supports users sharing their session keys with a trusted monitoring party. The prevalence of man-in-the-middle systems has shown that there is a clear need for introspection. Such an extension would go a long way towards relieving the danger from current approaches and also bringing this important issue to the table for standards groups to provide a safe and secure solution for enterprise security monitoring.
